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Abstract 
The self-positivity bias, which is inherent to healthy people, is known to be blunted in 
depression. The lack of positive or excessive negative self-reference is considered to be a 
potential mechanism underlying depressive rumination. However, the motivational factors 
that drive people to approach and avoid emotional self-related materials are still unclear. 
Therefore, we measured intrinsic motivation that is associated with emotional self-references 
by using a reward-based decision making task (Pay-Per-View paradigm). Forty-nine 
undergraduates completed two tasks in which they were asked to choose between negative vs. 
positive references (Task 1) and self vs. other references (Task 2) for variable monetary 
rewards. Participants with lower levels of depressive symptoms showed a self-positivity bias, 
sacrificing rewards for the opportunity to engage in positive self-reference, whereas those 
with higher levels of depressive symptoms had no specific preference for either negative or 
positive self-reference (Task 1). However, all participants sacrificed monetary rewards for the 
opportunity for self-reference versus other-reference, regardless of the symptom level or the 
primed valence (Task 2). Together, these findings suggest that depressive cognition could be 
characterized by the lack of intrinsic motivation for positive self-reference, which is 
attributable to the biased valence selection, but not to self-other preferences.  
 
Keywords: self, positivity bias, depression, reward, motivation 
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Is Self-Positive Information More Appealing than Money? Individual Differences in 
Positivity Bias according to Depressive Symptoms 
Introduction 
Generally people have a self-positivity bias, whereby positive materials are more likely to be 
attributed to internal, stable, and global factors than negative materials (Mezulis, Abramson, 
Hyde, & Hankin, 2004). However, such a self-serving positivity bias is weakened in 
individuals with depression; the bias is absent or reversed, with those individuals judging 
negative events to be caused by more internal, stable, and global factors (Mezulis et al., 2004). 
Furthermore, studies have suggested that non-depressed individuals consistently judge 
positive words or personality traits to be self-referent (applicable to themselves) and that 
those individuals show enhanced recall of the self-positive information (Symons & Johnson, 
1997), while depressed individuals exhibit no such positivity bias (e.g., Watson, Dritschel, 
Jentzsch, & Obonsawin, 2008). At the level of attentional processes, non-depressed people 
avoid negative stimuli, but people with depression attend equally to positive, neutral, and 
negative stimuli (Gotlib, McLachlan, & Katz, 1988; McCabe & Gotlib, 1995; McCabe, 
Gotlib, & Martin, 2000). Similarly, a meta-analysis of eye-tracking studies indicated that 
depression is associated with reduced gazing and dwelling on positive cues, but without a 
heightened vigilance for threatening stimuli (Armstrong & Olatunji, 2012). The lack of 
positivity bias or excessive negativity bias is considered to be associated with altered balance 
in the accessibility between positive and negative self-relevant information (e.g., Trew, 2011), 
which contributes to typical cognitive problems in depression such as negative self-schema 
and depressive rumination (Beck, 1976; Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco, & Lyubomirsky, 2008). 
Consistent with these arguments, studies on self-verification bias have suggested that 
individuals with depression prefer unfavorable feedback about themselves when offered a 
choice between favorable and unfavorable observations (Giesler, Josephs, & Swann, 1996; 
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Swann, Wenzlaff, Krull, & Pelham, 1992). This bias is interpreted to be driven by a 
motivation to collect information that is consistent with one’s self-concepts (or that verifies 
the self), which are negatively biased in individuals with depression. Such individuals also 
believe that depressive rumination is a useful coping strategy that prevents future mistakes 
(Papageorgiou & Wells, 2001; Watkins & Moulds, 2005); they therefore excessively 
ruminate about negative aspects of the self rather than engage in active problem-solving 
behaviors, which reinforces depressive symptoms such as avoidance and inactivity (Jacobson, 
Martell, & Dimidjian, 2001). 
These arguments regarding motivations and beliefs posit a possibility that 
individuals with depressive symptoms voluntarily discard positive and collect negative 
self-information. That is, they may estimate positive self-references to be less valuable than 
negative self-references, which could function as an intrinsic motivation to avoid positive and 
approach negative self-related stimuli. Recent cognitive theories of depression have placed 
greater emphasis on impaired attentional disengagement from negative self-relevant stimuli 
rather than early detection of (or attentional orienting toward) negative materials as an 
underlying mechanism of depressive cognitions (Gotlib & Joormann, 2010; Koster, De 
Lissnyder, Derakshan, & De Raedt, 2009). This theoretical account clearly explains why 
negative information processing is prolonged and perpetuated in depression. However, it is 
still unclear why individuals with depressive symptoms initially engage in such negative 
self-referent information processing. Therefore, we focused on the individual differences in 
subjective values of self-positive and self-negative materials in order to explore the intrinsic 
motivation for emotional self-references. 
Value scaling by the Pay-Per-View paradigm 
In the present study, we assessed subjective values associated with opportunities to 
engage in positive and negative self-references by using a newly developed adaptation of the 
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pay-per-view (PPV) task. This experimental task was originally introduced by Deaner, Khera, 
and Platt (2005), in whose study macaques had to choose between two options of viewing 
images of other monkeys that were associated with variable amount of rewards (juice). The 
male monkeys sacrificed the reward for the opportunity to view the images of female perinea 
and high-status monkey’s faces, but demanded overpayment to watch the faces of low-status 
members. Applying similar logic to human social cognition, recent studies evaluated the 
attractiveness of visual images of the opposite sex (Hayden, Parikh, Deaner, & Platt, 2007) 
and the subjective value of disclosing about the self (Tamir & Mitchell, 2012) by offering 
varying monetary rewards. People are willing to forgo a small monetary reward for viewing a 
picture of a physically attractive person (this was particularly so for males), and for 
introspecting about the self and sharing the self-related information with another person. 
Current investigation 
Extending the paradigm, we presented two parallel, emotionally loaded PPV tasks, 
in which participants were asked 1) to choose between positive and negative topics with 
variable financial rewards for “self” versus “other” references, and 2) to choose between self 
and other topics with variable rewards for predetermined positive and negative valences 
(Figure 1). In both tasks, participants could freely choose which type of (negative vs. 
positive; self vs. other) references they were going to engage in. However, because the two 
options were always tagged with variable amount of monetary rewards, they had to take into 
account the reward they could obtain from their choices. If a participant had a preference for 
positive self-reference, he/she would feel a conflict when deciding between a negative option 
with a greater reward and a positive option with a smaller reward. The experiment examined 
to what extent participants could forgo their potential rewards for an opportunity to engage in 
their preferred type of references, which could be used as an index of bias for emotionally 
valenced self-references. 
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Given the self-positivity bias, we hypothesized that individuals with lower levels of 
depressive symptoms would forgo a larger amount of rewards to engage in positive 
self-reference in Task 1. However, individuals with higher levels of depressive symptoms 
would show no such positivity bias, by showing no preference for positive or negative 
self-reference (weak hypothesis), or by disregarding the positive and appreciating the 
negative self-references by sacrificing rewards to obtain an opportunity for negative 
self-reference (strong hypothesis). 
The purpose of Task 2 (reversing the temporal order of the reference target and 
valence) was to reveal the hierarchical structure between the target (self vs. other) and 
valence (negative vs. positive) selections, and to determine at which stage depression-specific 
bias could be generated. Neuroimaging studies have suggested that emotional self-reference 
modulates brain activity in cortico-limbic networks (e.g., Fossati et al., 2003, 2004; 
Yoshimura, Ueda, Suzuki, Onoda, Okamoto, & Yamawaki, 2009), and that the processing of 
self-reference and emotional valence takes place in different brain areas: medial prefrontal 
cortex for self-relevance judgment and ventral anterior cingulate for resolving the valence of 
the information (Moran Macrae, Heatherton, Wyland, & Kelley, 2006). A recent study using 
event-related brain potentials suggested enhanced cortical processing for negative stimuli 
under self-reference (primed by personal pronoun), implying that self-reference influences 
subsequent emotional processing (Herbert, Pauli, & Herbert, 2011).  
Given such a processing hierarchy, there are three possibilities for the bias 
generating stages in individuals with depressive symptoms: when processing 
self/other-references, when processing emotional valence, or during both stages. Our first 
experimental task assumed the same temporal order of processing as argued in previous 
studies, in which the primed reference target should influence the subsequent selection of 
emotional valence. In this design, we could specify the bias in the relatively later stage of 
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processing, or valence selection. However, the preference for self and other references could 
not be fully captured. This issue was addressed in Task 2 by reversing the temporal order of 
the processing, which provides a direct comparison between self and other preferences under 
prefixed emotional valence. At the same time, Task 2 allowed us to test if there exists a 
feedback loop wherein priming specific emotional valence inversely influences subsequent 
self-referent processing. This backward processing has not been examined thoroughly in 
previous studies. 
Thus, if a reduced self-positivity bias in individuals with depressive symptoms can 
be characterized by biased emotional processing of self-referent information, Task 1 would 
exhibit a significant difference in valence choice between higher and lower levels of 
depressive symptoms under the self-primed condition. Furthermore, if biased self-other 
preference is also relevant to depressive cognitions, Task 2 would reveal symmetrical results 
cf. Task 1, showing a significant effect of depressive symptoms on self-other selection under 
positive (and negative) valence. 
Method 
Participants and procedure 
Forty-nine undergraduates (29 male, 20 female; mean age = 19.7 years old, SD = 1.0) 
were recruited during the introductory psychology courses at several universities in Japan, 
and provided their written informed consent upon arriving at the laboratory. All experimental 
instructions and stimuli were displayed using E-Prime software, version 2.0 (Psychology 
Software Tools, Pittsburgh, PA). Participants first completed a non-emotional version of the 
PPV task
1
 (not reported here) that was identical to Study 2 conducted by Tamir and Mitchell 
                                                                
1
 This preliminary task comprised three conditions with varying question pairs: self-other, self-fact, and 
other-fact. Participants had to choose one question type for each of the pairs that were associated with variable 
monetary rewards, as in the main experimental tasks. In the fact condition, participants answered trivia items 
with “true” or “false” (e.g., “the sky is blue”) instead of rating self- or other-related attitudes or opinions (self vs. 
Barack Obama). Bland questions were used for the self and other choices, which asked participants about their 
own (or Obama’s) interests, preferences, and habits (e.g., I [or Obama] like[s] dogs; I often listen to classical 
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(2012), after which they performed the two PPV tasks (see below) reported in this paper. The 
order of the latter two PPV tasks was randomized across participants. All participants 
subsequently completed a set of self-report questionnaires, were debriefed, and paid the 
amount acquired during the tasks. 
Measures 
Depressive symptoms were assessed using the Japanese version of the Center for 
Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale (CES-D; Radloff, 1977; Shima, Shikano, Kitamura, 
& Asai, 1985, for the Japanese version). The CES-D is a 20-item self-report scale that 
assesses the level of depression during the previous week, with each item being rated on a 
4-point scale of frequency of occurrence ranging from 0 (less than 1 day) to 3 (5–7 days), 
with a cutoff score of 16 indicating significant depressive symptoms. In the present study, the 
CES-D mean score was 13.9 (SD = 6.7) and the scale had good internal consistency (α = .76). 
We did not find either gender- or age-dependent differences in levels of depressive symptoms 
(t = 0.44, p = .66, for gender; r = .16, p = .27, for age). 
Emotional pay-per-view tasks 
In two parallel tasks, the participants completed two different emotional PPV tasks in 
which primer and question-type pairs were manipulated (see Figure 1). In both tasks, each 
trial started with a 500-ms fixation period, following which one of two primers appeared on 
the PC screen, remaining visible for 500 ms. In Task 1, the primer consisted either of Self or 
Obama; in Task 2, the primer was Negative or Positive. After the presentation of the primer, 
two question types were displayed (Negative and Positive in Task 1; Self and Obama in 
Task2). Barack Obama was selected as a representative “other” stimulus, because a public 
person has been used in prior studies self-other processing (Bower & Gilligan, 1979; Kelley, 
Macrae, Wyland, Caglar, Inati, & Heatherton, 2002; Tamir and Mitchell, 2012), and because 
                                                                                                                                                                                                       
music; I’m interested in economic issues). We found no significant differences for levels of depressive 
symptoms in terms of self-choice frequencies, which suggests that there would be no depression-specific biases 
in preference for self (in support of the results of Task 2). 
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Barack Obama, as a president of the US, is widely known in Japan. Close friends or family 
members were possible alternative “other” stimuli that could have eliminated influences of 
familiarity and knowledge, which were potential limitations of the Barack Obama stimulus. 
However, we considered it more important to control for individual differences in the 
alternative stimuli, because low-quality social relationships among depressed individuals 
might influence their choice behaviors (Teo, Choi, & Valenstein, 2013). Furthermore, an 
interdependent view of the self, which is typical among non-Western people (Markus & 
Kitayama, 1991), could blur the contrast between self and other if we used “other” stimuli 
that are closely associated with the self. 
Each question type was associated with a small monetary reward ranging from 1 to 4 
JPY (1 JPY = 0.01 USD) following the previous study of Tamir and Mitchell (2012). The 
payoff values were quasi-randomly determined across trials, with the frequencies of the 
relative payoffs for the two choices (ranging from −3 to 3) being equal. The relative payoffs 
were determined by the differences in the payoffs between the Positive and Negative (Self 
and Obama) choices, indicating the rewards for Positive (Self) choices relative to Negative 
(Obama) choices.  
At the choice stage, participants were to indicate within 2000 ms which question type 
they preferred to answer, taking into account the payoff amount associated with the two 
question types. Prior to the experimental session, all participants were informed that they 
would receive the money they had accumulated during the PPV tasks at the end of the 
experiment. Although we did not explicitly instruct participants to maximize their total 
rewards, participants were informed that any choice strategy was acceptable and that they 
could always choose the option with a greater reward. After the preference choice was made, 
participants were asked to answer a brief question corresponding to the selected 
primer-question pair. For example, if Self was primed and the participant selected a Positive 
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question type, a positive question (e.g., “Happy?”) was displayed on the PC screen and the 
participant had to indicate to what extent the question was applicable to themselves. On the 
other hand, if Negative was primed and Obama selected, participants rated to what extent 
they thought the displayed negative statement (e.g., “Unhappy?”) applied to Barack Obama. 
Each question was rated on a 5-point Likert scale, ranging from 1 (not at all) to 5 (very much). 
When making the preference choices, participants were informed only of the question types 
(i.e., Negative vs. Positive; Self vs. Obama); the specific content of the questions (e.g., 
“Happy?”) was blinded until the question-rating display appeared. Thus, within a trial, the 
participant’s choice behavior was not influenced by whether the subsequent question was 
applicable to themselves (and Barack Obama) or not. 
We compiled a list of short sentences describing personalities and moods, which 
included 98 pairs of negative and positive sentences (the two tasks shared the same list). Most 
of the sentences were derived from existing questionnaires on personality, depression, 
anxiety, and social skills, but the negative and positive sentences were modified to produce 
bipolar sets of traits (e.g., happy vs. unhappy, arrogant vs. humble, frequently having 
troubles with family members vs. having a good relationship with family members). All items 
had been validated as having negative or positive valence by two psychology researchers who 
were blind to the aims of the study. 
This question rating was inserted to prompt the participants to search and process the 
information that corresponded to the primer and selected question type for each trial. Because 
our primary interest was in the preference that existed before engaging in actual 
self/other-referent processing, we do not regard it as important to investigate what kind of 
information was actually processed at the end of trials (i.e., the ratings to the short questions). 
However, in our data, the frequency of the rating response of 1 (not at all) was only 8.8% 
(Task 1) and 9.5% (Task 2) across all trials. These results suggest that in more than 90% of 
POSITIVE SELF AND DEPRESSION                                        11 
 
the trials, participants retrieved their own (or Barack Obama’s) attributes that corresponded to 
the primer and question type, although the extent of applicability differed across individuals 
depending on levels of depressive symptoms (see also Table 1). 
Each task comprised eight practice trials followed by 112 experimental trials (8 trials, 
each with 7 payoffs and 2 primers). The order of the two tasks was randomized across 
participants. Our main results remained when we controlled in our analyses for task order, 
which had no significant influence on the Positive (Task 1) and Self (Task 2) choice 
frequencies (ps > .27). Because we applied multilevel modeling analysis (described in the 
next section), we determined the sample size following a prior suggestion of at least 30 
participants with at least 30 responses per participant (Hox, 2010). Although a sample size of 
30 is enough to estimate fixed parameters, simulation studies suggest that 50 participants 
could provide less biased estimates of the standard errors, while this larger sample size is also 
less likely to suffer from the non-convergence problem (Maas & Hox, 2005). 
Statistical analyses 
Multilevel logistic analyses were performed with choice pattern as the within-subject 
outcome and with the CES-D score as the between-subjects predictor. This analytical 
approach enabled us to test the between-subject differences in depression in terms of the 
psychometric functions of choice, and to estimate the points of subjective equality (PSE) as a 
function of the levels of depression. The within-person level model was as follows:  
)( 101
1
ijjj xij e
y
 

   (1) 
where yij is the choice on the ith trial of the jth participant, which is a binary 
distributed variable, coded as 1 for a Positive and 0 for a Negative choice in Task 1 and as 1 
for Self and 0 for Other in Task 2. xij is the relative payoff given the two choices, ranging 
from −3 to 3 JPY. The intercept (β0j) and slope (β1j) determine the shape of the logistic 
function; the overall probability of a “yes” response in yij is determined by β0j, and the 
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steepness of the logistic function depends on β1j. These parameters were assumed to be 
different between primer types, and also influenced by levels of depressive symptoms. Thus, 
the person-level equations of the intercept were: 

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where DEPj is the CES-D score, and u0j is a random effect expressing individual 
differences in the intercept estimate. The CES-D score was standardized prior to being 
entered into the analysis for ease of interpretation. Each experimental task had two types of 
Primer with 0 indicating Self and 1 indicting Obama in Task 1, and with 0 indicating 
Negative and 1 indicating Positive in Task 2. As in equation (2), the slope was also described 
by the mean, effect of depressive symptoms, and random effects for the two types of primer: 
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In this model, the PSE (the amount of money at which the values of two question 
types are perceived to be equal) is described as follows: 
j
j
jPSE
1
0


          (4) 
Using this equation, we calculated four conditional PSEs (primer type vs. levels of 
depressive symptoms) for each task by substituting specific values of higher and lower levels 
of depressive symptoms (mean ± 1SD; e.g., Preacher, Curran, & Bauer, 2006). These PSE 
scores provide absolute-value estimates of the opportunity to engage in a particular kind of 
self-/other-reference on the money scale (with zero PSE inferring no preference for either of 
the question types). For example, if we observed PSE = -1 in Task 1, this would mean that 
participants chose the Positive option even when the reward for the Positive option was 1 
JPY smaller than that for the Negative option. As such, a negative value of the PSE can be 
interpreted as the relative reward amount that participants can (or are willing to) forgo for the 
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opportunity for positive self-reference. It should be noted that the interpretation of the 
conditional PSEs is different between the two experiments because the choice responses 
concerned different pairs of question types: a greater negative value of the conditional PSE 
indicates a greater preference for the Positive question type in Task 1, while it reflects a 
greater preference for the Self question type in Task 2. 
We tested whether the conditional PSEs were significantly different from zero by 
estimating 95% confidence intervals. Differences between any pairs of conditional PSEs (e.g., 
differences in PSEs for the Self primer for higher and lower levels of depression) were also 
tested. These analyses were conducted using the SAS NLMIXED procedure. The 
ESTIMATE statement was used to calculate the means and standard errors of the conditional 
PSEs, and to test the significance of the differences between the PSE target pairs (Spoth, 
Redmond, Shin, & Azevedo, 2004). 
Results 
Manipulation check 
As a preliminary analysis, we examined the mean rating score for each primer and 
question type (Table 1), by estimating linear multilevel models in which the rating score was 
predicted by the CES-D, primer type, selected question type, and their interactions. In the 
Self-primer condition of Task 1, participants with higher levels of depressive symptoms gave 
a higher score when they selected a negative question type (t = 7.10, p = .00). They also 
provided a lower score in response to a positive question (t = 3.39, p = .00), consistent with 
the results of Watson et al. (2008). However, in the Obama-primer condition, there were no 
significant differences according to the level of depressive symptoms, although positive 
attributes were judged to be more applicable than negative attributes across all participants (t 
= 22.73, p = .00). A similar pattern was observed in Task 2, suggesting that only when the 
Self question type was selected, did individuals with higher levels of depressive symptoms 
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consider the negative attributes as more applicable and the positive attributes as less 
applicable. These results suggest that depressive symptoms are associated with a self-concept 
that includes more negative and less positive attributes. However, such depression-related 
differences only existed for self-regard, not other-regard (i.e., Obama, who tended to be more 
positively evaluated). 
Main results 
In Task 1, we found a significant effect of the CES-D on the intercept component 
(β04) of the model predicting the probability of Positive choice (Table 2), indicating that the 
participants with lower levels of depressive symptoms exhibited a greater tendency to choose 
Positive when Self was primed (Figure 2A). This significant effect of the CES-D was only 
observed in the Self prime condition, which was significantly larger than the Obama prime 
condition (t = 4.84, p < .001). In the self-as-primer condition, conditional PSEs  differed 
significantly as a function of depression level (difference = .35, t = 3.26, p = .002; Figure 3), 
with students who reported higher levels of depression showing no specific preference for 
negative or positive items (PSE = -.05), while those with lower levels of depressive 
symptoms had a greater tendency to choose positive self-related topics, more frequently 
sacrificing a reward to get an opportunity to engage in positive self-reflections (PSE = -.40). 
However, in the Obama-as-primer condition (Figure 2B), there were no significant 
differences according to the level of depressive symptoms (difference = -.02, t = 0.19, p 
= .85), with all participants exhibiting a moderate preference for Positive items (high 
depression: PSE = -.18; low depression: PSE = -.19). Within the “high depression” group, the 
PSE was significantly lower when Self was primed than when Obama was primed (difference 
= .12, t = 2.87, p = .006), whereas in the “low depression” group the PSE was significantly 
higher when Self was primed (difference = .21, t = 3.32, p = .002). These results suggest that 
depressive symptoms are associated with a lack of preference for positive self-relevant 
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information, although the participants did show a moderate preference for positive topics 
when these related to Obama, irrespective of the symptom level. 
In Task 2, two participants could not complete the task due to a program error, which 
meant that data from 47 participants was used for the multilevel logistic analysis. This 
showed neither a significant main effect nor an interaction effect for depression and type of 
primer in the model predicting the probability of a Self choice (Table 3). These results 
indicate that there were no significant differences in the shapes of the sigmoid functions 
depending on depression level and primer type (Figure 2C, D). Conditional PSEs are shown 
in Figure 3. Although all four PSEs were significantly smaller than zero (PSEs < - .24, upper 
limits of 95% CI < - .04), comparisons between the two primers and higher and lower levels 
of depression did not yield any significant differences (ts < 1.22, ps > .23). These results 
suggest that, irrespective of depression level, the participants all deemed Self a more valuable 
topic to think about than Obama, regardless of its valence. 
Discussion 
We sought to shed new light on the differential motivational functions of emotional 
self-references in relation to levels of depressive symptoms. Our results of Task 1 support the 
weak hypothesis, which states that depressive symptoms are associated with a lack of 
intrinsic motivation to engage in positive self-reference. The participants reporting higher 
levels of depressive symptoms showed no specific preference for either negative or positive 
self-reference, whereas those with lower levels of depressive symptoms did show a 
significant preference for positive self-references, forgoing monetary rewards for an 
opportunity to engage in self-referencing cognition. However, this depression-specific bias 
was only observable in the valence choices of Task 1; all participants preferred self-reference 
to other-reference independent of valence and symptom level in Task 2, which implies that 
the individual differences in depressive symptoms are generated at the stage of emotional 
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self-referent processing, or when selecting the emotional valence, but not when selecting the 
target of reference. 
The results of Task 1 are consistent with previous findings suggesting a self-positivity 
bias in non-vulnerable or non-depressed individuals (e.g., Mezulis et al., 2004), meaning that 
such individuals exhibit cognitive avoidance of negative self-related stimuli and/or are 
oriented towards positive ones, whereas depressed individuals show no such bias (negative or 
positive). This protective positivity bias is thought to enable non-depressed people to divert 
their attention away from negative stimuli and direct it towards positive stimuli, thereby 
shielding themselves from negative self-referent processing while preserving and promoting 
positive self-views (McCabe et al., 2000). Our findings indicate that this defense mechanism 
may be driven by an intrinsic motivation to enhance positive information processing, which is 
perceived as more valuable than negative self-reference. However, when selecting the 
valence of reference for another individual, our participants all showed moderate preferences 
for positive reference, irrespective of the level of depressive symptoms. This suggests that in 
individuals with depressive symptoms the protective positivity bias is active if their attention 
is focused on others, while it is “turned off” when reflecting on the self. 
This lack of preference for positive (or avoidance of negative) self-reference might 
not only contribute to negative cognitive activities such as depressive rumination. It is 
possible that it is also associated with maladaptive interpersonal styles, such as increased 
negative speech content and excessive reassurance-seeking in interactions with others (e.g., 
Coyne, 1976; Gotlib & Robinson, 1982). Researchers have argued that depression-prone 
individuals do not have the motivation to refrain from choosing negative topics in their 
self-reference (Coyne, 1976; Kendall, Howard, & Hays, 1989). This argument is supported 
by a number of studies that suggest that such socially inappropriate behaviors induce negative 
affect in interaction partners and elicit social rejection, which in turn exacerbates depressive 
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symptoms and constitutes a vicious cycle of negative affect (see Starr & Davila, 2008, for a 
meta-analytic review). 
In Task 2, all participants sacrificed monetary rewards for the opportunity for 
self-reference, regardless of the symptom level or the primed valence, implying that 
self-reference is considered more valuable than other-reference even if the content is negative 
(cf., Tamir & Mitchell, 2012). From these asymmetrical results between Tasks 1 and 2, we 
infer that the bias is generated not at the stage of self-referent processing, but only at the 
emotional processing stage after the information framing of self-relatedness. Researchers 
have suggested that processing of self-relevance and emotional valence takes place in 
different brain areas: Incoming information is judged to be self-relevant in medial prefrontal 
cortex, and the valence of the information is resolved in an adjacent brain area, ventral 
anterior cingulate (Moran et al., 2006; Watson et al., 2007).In line with these findings, our 
results show that these two types of information processing is separable in terms of the bias in 
depressive symptomatology. Furthermore, the bias-generating process (i.e., resolving the 
valence of given self-referent information) would be unidirectional because Task 2 revealed 
null effects of primed emotional valence and depressive symptoms on subsequent self-other 
choice preferences (i.e., processing self-reference of given negative or positive information). 
The process captured in the present study may reflect a strategic aspect of self-focus, 
which involves evaluation and integration of self-relevant materials as in our decision making 
tasks (Lemogne, Delaveau, Freton, Guionnet, & Fossati, 2012). This process is considered to 
be separate from more automatic processes, which underlie encoding incoming information 
as being potentially self-relevant, and attracting attention to such self-relevant information 
(Lemogne et al., 2012; Northoff, Heinzel, de Greck, Bermpohl, Dobrowolny, & Panksepp, 
2006). Because we explicitly manipulated the self- (or other-) tagging of information by 
presenting a primer, we cannot know how self-positivity bias was related to these automatic 
POSITIVE SELF AND DEPRESSION                                        18 
 
processes in the present study. However, previous studies have suggested that automatic 
processes are also relevant to depression by contributing to increased spontaneous and 
difficult-to-inhibit forms of self-focus, such as depressive rumination (Gotlib & Joormann 
2010; Johnson, Nolen-Hoeksema, Mitchell, & Levin, 2009). We speculate that these two 
processes might interact to generate negative and persistent self-relevant processing in 
individuals with depression, who tend to perceive a stimulus as being self-referent and are 
less motivated to process the positive aspects of self than those without depression 
The analyses of the ratings for short questions replicated the positivity bias in 
non-depressed individuals that previous studies have reported (e.g., Watson et al., 2008). 
Individuals with lower levels of depressive symptoms judged positive attributes to be more 
applicable and negative attributes less applicable to themselves. Given the self-verification 
bias theory (Giesler et al., 1996; Swann et al., 1992), we speculate that the motivation to 
approach positive self-relevant information is driven by the fact that the positive materials 
reassure the non-depressed individuals that their relatively positive self-views are veridical 
and reliable. Such a self-confirming evaluation promotes a sense of self-coherency, and 
fosters the perception that individuals are correctly apprehending themselves (Giesler et al. 
1996). This speculation posits another hypothesis stating that the value estimation of 
self-references might reflect the distance between core self-concepts and given personality 
trait stimuli. For example, individuals with higher levels of self-esteem and narcissism are 
expected to estimate positive self-statement to be more valuable (cf. Giesler et al., 1996; 
Swann et al., 1992). Future research needs to clarify if the value estimation in the PPV task is 
actually linked to the self-confirming evaluation, and to what extent PPV valuation reflects 
positivity or negativity of self-concepts, by using other “self” experiments such as the 
Implicit Association Test (Greenwald & Farnham, 2000). 
Our results should be interpreted with caution because of the following two important 
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limitations. First, the non-clinical nature of our sample (i.e., university students) tempers the 
conclusions we can draw regarding depression. Although participants with higher levels of 
depression exhibited no specific preference towards negative or positive materials, it is still 
possible that individuals with clinically diagnosed depression would show an explicit 
preference for negative self-reference. It is also noteworthy that university students tend to 
score higher on depression scales than the general population and other age groups (e.g., 
Ibrahim, Kelly, Adams, Glazebrook, 2013; Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, 2000), 
which might limit the generalizability of our findings. Second, we did not include any 
comparisons between neutral and negative (or positive) self-references. Although our PPV 
paradigm can clearly define a “point of zero preference,” which indicates no preference either 
for negative or positive self-references, this zero point is set on a unidimensional 
negative-positive scale, and so reveals nothing about preference towards neutral 
self-references (cf. Gotlib et al., 1988). Thus, future research needs to reexamine our 
hypotheses and conclusions using clinical samples, making use of comparisons between 
valenced and neutral materials. Third, we used a particular public person (i.e., Barack 
Obama) as an “other” stimulus. It is possible that the findings of the present study are specific 
to this stimulus. Furthermore, we did not control the participants’ familiarity with Barack 
Obama, which leaves the possibility that the preference for self-reference in Task 2 may be 
attributed to a lack of knowledge about Barack Obama (e.g., participants were unwilling to 
make ratings of an unfamiliar person). Future research needs to examine whether the current 
findings can be replicated for different “other” stimuli, such as close friends and relatives, 
which could control for influences of familiarity and knowledge regarding other references. 
In conclusion, our data suggest that individuals with higher levels of depressive 
symptoms did not have a specific preference for negative or positive self-references, whereas 
those with lower levels of depressive symptoms had a clear self-positivity bias. This 
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individual difference in the value estimation of emotional self-references could be generated 
at the stage of emotional valence (but not self-other relevance) processing. Such reduced 
intrinsic motivation for positive self-reference could contribute to a relatively greater 
tendency to engage in negative ruminative thinking and socially inappropriate self-disclosure 
among depression-prone people. As for clinical implications, it seems relevant to boost the 
subjective value of positive self-concepts, thus activating the blunted protective bias. This 
could be achieved, for instance, by training (depressed) individuals to orient themselves more 
positively with regard to their attention, interpretation, and behavior; this may promote better 
regulation of emotion and increase the tendency to approach, rather than avoid, 
environmental rewards (Holmes, Lang, & Shah, 2009; Wadlinger & Isaacowitz, 2011; 
Watkins et al., 2011). 
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Table 1 
Mean (and SD) of rating scores for individuals with higher and lower levels of depressive 
symptoms 
Task 1 Primer = Self Primer = Obama 
 Negative Positive Negative Positive 
Low CES-D 2.90 (1.21) 3.41 (0.98) 2.37 (1.04) 3.92 (0.93) 
High CES-D 3.27 (1.22) 2.89 (1.07) 2.41 (1.13) 4.03 (0.87) 
Task 2 Primer = Negative Primer = Positive 
 Self Obama Self Obama 
Low CES-D 2.86 (1.18) 2.35 (1.07) 3.36 (1.04) 3.84 (0.96) 
High CES-D 3.31 (1.20) 2.48 (1.16) 2.91 (1.02) 3.94 (0.94) 
Note. CESD-D = Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale. Mean and SD were 
calculated on a trial basis (not on within-person means). The number of trials varied across 
cells, ranging from n = 358 to 656. For high and low levels of depressive symptoms (Task 1: 
n = 16 and n = 17; Task 2: n = 16 and n = 16), participants with upper and lower one-thirds of 
the CES-D score (more than 16 and less than 11) were selected based on the CES-D cutoff 
score of 16. 
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Table 2 
Parameter estimates for the multilevel logistic models predicting the probability of a positive 
choice in Task 1 
Parameter 
Primer = Self Primer = Obama Differences 
Estimate (SE) t p Estimate (SE) t p t p 
Intercept          
Intercept (γ000, γ010) 0.71 (0.13) 5.25 .000 0.64 (0.13) 4.81 .000 0.60 .554 
CES-D (γ001, γ011) -0.51 (0.14) 3.75 .000 0.03 (0.13) 0.25 .805 4.84 .000 
Slope           
Intercept (γ100, γ110) 3.42 (0.44) 7.75 .000 3.52 (0.44) 7.97 .000 1.33 .191 
CES-D (γ101, γ111) 0.41 (0.40) 1.04 .300 0.34 (0.40) 0.85 .397 0.82 .419 
Pseudo R
2
 .66        
Note. CESD-D = Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale. Pseudo R
2
 was adapted 
from McFadden’s R2 (Hox, 2010). 
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Table 3 
Parameter estimates for the multilevel logistic models predicting the probability of a self 
choice in Task 2 
Parameter 
Primer = Negative Primer = Positive Differences 
Estimate (SE) t p Estimate (SE) t p t p 
Intercept          
Intercept (γ000, γ010) 1.28 (0.24) 5.45 .000 1.20 (0.24) 5.10 .000 0.76 .449 
CES-D (γ001, γ011) 0.31 (0.23) 1.36 .182 0.37 (0.23) 1.58 .122 0.46 .645 
Slope           
Intercept (γ100, γ110) 3.59 (0.45) 8.01 .000 3.62 (0.45) 8.07 .000 0.39 .699 
CES-D (γ101, γ111) 0.14 (0.40) 0.34 .734 0.15 (0.40) 0.38 .708 0.20 .846 
Pseudo R
2
 .65        
Note. CESD-D = Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale. Pseudo R
2
 was adapted 
from McFadden’s R2 (Hox, 2010). 
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Figure 1. Schematic flows of the two tasks. After the presentation of a prime (Self or Obama 
in Task 1; Negative or Positive in Task 2), participants indicated which question type they 
wished to answer (Negative vs. Positive in Task 1; Self vs. Obama in Task 2) while 
considering the monetary reward associated with each question type. Depending on their 
decision, they answered a short question that corresponded to the prime and their chosen 
question type on a 5-point Likert scale. 
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Figure 2. The proportion of Positive (Task 1; panels A and B) and Self (Task 2; panels C and 
D) choices as a function of the relative payoffs for each primer condition. For high and low 
levels of depressive symptoms (Task 1: n = 16 and n = 17; Task 2: n = 16 and n = 16), 
participants with upper and lower one-thirds of the CES-D score (more than 16 and less than 
11) were selected based on the CES-D cutoff score of 16. Error bars indicate ±1SEM 
(standard error of the mean). 
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Figure 3. Points of subjective equality (PSEs) for the Negative (Task 1) and Self (Task 2) 
question types. Conditional PSEs were calculated from the estimated multilevel models for 
each primer (Self and Obama in Task 1; Negative and Positive in Task 2) and for higher and 
lower levels of depressive symptoms by substituting specific scores of the depression scale 
(mean ± 1 SD). A greater negative value of the conditional PSE indicates a greater preference 
for the Positive question type in Experiment 1 and for the Self question type in Experiment 2. 
Error bars indicate the 95% confidence interval. 
